



# Global Muslim Diaspora Preliminary Findings

Prepared by Social Sciences University of Ankara  
for  
“Workshop on Muslim Diaspora:  
Prospects and Challenges for Global Peace and Prosperity”  
May 12-13 2018 Istanbul-Turkey



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May 2018

**The Global Muslim Diaspora (GMD) Project** has been commissioned by the Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) to Social Sciences University of Ankara.

The GMD Project aims at identifying of the various diasporic communities of the OIC member countries around the world and analysing their major characteristics with a view to better understanding their conditions and the problems they face in the countries they currently reside in. In particular, the Project aims to explore the difficulties they encounter in their host countries such as social integration, participation into economic activity and inclusion in the labour market, access to services, and family union. It also aims to assess the contribution of these communities towards the economic development of their origin countries.

## 1. BACKGROUND

The growing Muslim population is no longer a phenomenon exclusive to the Middle East-North Africa and Asia-Pacific regions. According to the 2011 data over 1/5 of World's Muslim population, today lives in Europe, North America and Australia. Statistical data claims that the number of Muslims is reaching up to 44,138,000 in Europe and to 5,256,000 in the USA. Put it differently, Muslims now constitute one of the largest and most widespread diasporas in the World.

In parallel with their global eminence, a literature on Muslims diaspora, and Muslim immigrants, specifically in the West, is growing from year to year. Yet, much of the interest in diasporic Muslim communities lies in and evolves around few common topics: the rise of Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments among Western societies, and the like. Correspondingly, during the field studies of GMD Project, the research team has found that Muslim immigrants, political activists, leaders, and organizations in the West are now excessively skeptical and concerned about, if not weary of, becoming source material for researches and studies that decidedly frame their whole subjectivity, presence, and experiences within worn-out binarism of "potential threat" or "victims of Islamophobia and systematic discrimination."

This regrettably limited yet dominating interest in Muslim communities does not only work towards setting invisible yet academically, socially, and politically acknowledged boundaries for the respective scholarship but even more dangerously structure the global knowledge on Muslims in general. Islamophobia is becoming a globally legitimate political idiom, more acceptable and politically correct, yet alarmingly fixing, diminishing, and victimising the Muslim presence and subjectivity. Thus as SESRIC, we believe that a project on the Muslim diaspora whose central focus is clearly not Islamophobia and whose objective is to prove that Muslims are much more than the scepticism, concerns, and questions that are attached to them by Western societies, power circles and policy makers, has never been more urgent and essential.

In such context, SESRIC was convinced that in order to deconstruct these boundaries and overcome such obstacles it is imperative that intellectual, academic, and political actors of Muslim community undertake their responsibility and play an active role in collecting, producing, processing and publicising the knowledge concerning diasporic Muslim communities. If collecting information and data is a task for researchers and research centres, then producing the accurate and needed knowledge is an ethical obligation and a political mission.

## 2. GOALS and OBJECTIVES

The data on the country-oriented distribution of Muslims, as individuals and groups, *i.e.*, which country do they live, their demographic, socio-economic aspects, political postures and positioning, their access to public goods and services etc. are scattered, inadequate, and not updated. This shortage of information stands as an anomaly giving that the role attributed to these Muslim groups in both anti- and pro-Muslim circles, a future lever for change or a growing threat on the global stage, is significant. SESRIC believes that this shortage influences and deteriorates the lack of dialogue, mutual awareness, and meaningful interaction which are the only effective answers to the problems of global society. Particularly in the current European and American contexts, where debates about immigration and integration have become extremely heated and anti-immigrant sentiments, Islamophobia, and the rise of extreme right started to fuel concerns about the future of Muslims in non-Muslim countries, a quality and all-encompassing research on Muslim diasporic groups is not only a socio-political responsibility but a global imperative.

The principal objectives of the GMD were to evaluate the societal, political, economic, and legal presence and influence of Muslim groups in non-Muslim countries through desk research, field studies and comparative analyses. During the three field studies, the research team observed that despite the increase in both size and importance of diasporic Muslim communities, the level of interaction and cooperation between different ethnic, socio-cultural, and denominational Muslim groups remain strikingly low. It was observed that diasporic Muslim groups of the same context have very limited knowledge of the other Muslim groups and almost no information about Muslims of other countries. Put differently, despite its growing international and transnational influence and significance, global Muslim community is more fragmented and isolated than ever. This picture, needles to point, enhances the importance and role of the GMD as a provider and creator of an international and transnational space for Muslim interaction.

The expected outputs of the GMD Project, some of which are already achieved or close to completion, are categorized under five headings: (i) *The Atlas of Global Muslim Communities*: An interactive map and website, clearly and comprehensively illustrating various data on Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries, (ii) *Country Reports relying on primary data*: Muslim community reports publicizing field research findings and analysis, (iii) *Project Results Report*: Report on every research, techniques and methodologies used during the Project in an update enabling format, (iv) *Developing Cooperation between OIC and various Institutions in Host Countries*: The project is expected to create conditions for enhanced communication and cooperation between OIC and various institutions in host countries, particularly migration management institutions, and (v) *Academic publications*: books, book chapters, articles, audio-visuals etc.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

In line with the above-mentioned objectives, the GMD Project collected data and information on the following headings:

- (i) Muslim's lives in their migrated countries, their demographic profile, and economic, social, political, legal, and cultural presence;
- (ii) migrant countries' perceptions of and attitudes towards Muslim communities, the level of legal/political/religious/cultural rights and freedoms, and future projections;
- (iii) Muslim diasporic communities' relations with the host society, countries of origin, other Muslim countries and societies, other immigrant and diasporic communities.

The project was conducted through two major steps:

A. *Desk research* through which a comprehensive review of existing data sources was conducted.

B. *Field research* in selected countries through which primary data concerning the above mentioned main themes were collected.

In order to collect data and information the following activities have been conducted before, during, and after the field studies:

**Activity 1:** Through research on secondary data sources

- Conceptual discussions were made and the theoretical background was provided.
- Forming the Muslim diaspora map through filling the factsheet produced composed of relevant variables for each country identified concerning the thematic focus and objectives of the study
- Field research design for primary sources/data collection was conducted based on secondary sources through identification of relevant experts, policy-makers, Muslim NGOs, etc.

**Activity 2:** Pilot Fieldworks for collecting primary data

- Detailed fieldwork including interviews with selected key individuals, workshops with representatives of Muslim NGOs, and a survey with 150 Muslim individuals in each of the three countries: the UK, Germany, and France.

**Activity 3:** Preparation of monitoring reports for field research carried out in Europe.


**Activity 4:** Country reports on local Muslim minorities in the pilot countries.

## 4. FINDINGS

### a. SECONDARY RESEARCH FINDINGS

Secondary data research aimed to draw the Muslim communities’ profiles within the “non-Muslim” countries. Secondary source research was obtained via Eurostat and Europe-oriented national/local office and units’ open data, census results, literature review, published research, and policy reports. This data was utilized for the factsheets and for the country analyses provided in the general report.

The factsheets were prepared for 48 countries and utilized as the input for an interactive atlas. It was required to group countries with a comparable degree and detail of data together while, at the same time, having a minimum degree of data from all countries. In line with this, the data were collected from countries in a logical order. Therefore, a 4-tier approach was developed beginning with 1<sup>st</sup> Tier Countries, which are the G8 countries, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Tier Countries which are comprised of the G20 and the other major EU countries, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Tier Countries, the remaining EU Countries, and the 4<sup>th</sup> Tier Countries, other countries with Muslim communities (See Figure below).



The “Muslim Diaspora Factsheets” analyzed the current situations, experiences, and conditions of Muslim diaspora communities with below-stated three parts:

- The Country Context
- Profile of the Muslim Communities in Each Country
- Monitoring of the Country in Relation to the Rights and Representation of Muslim Communities

*The Country Context* section is, in turn, divided into two main subsections: the historical context and the legal/political/social context. Countries are shaped by the unique historical experiences they have undergone. Therefore, information concerning the historical background in each country with respect to immigration, Muslim communities, and main non-Muslim immigrant communities has been investigated. The more comprehensive legal/political/social section has examined every significant contextual variable from institutional structure, legal framework, education policies, and integration vision to discrimination and citizenship policies. This section will also present information collected on significant institutions established by Muslim communities as well as noteworthy Muslims who have become significant within their community.

*Profile of the Muslim Communities* are formed by gathering data on several important variables. Firstly, the demographic profile of the Muslim diaspora communities will be investigated with respect to the statistical figures of age, sex, marriage, and citizenship status. Following this, an examination of education, socio-economic status, political participation, and political representation will be discussed. A description of the number, qualities and characteristics of religious organizations and institutions established by the Muslim communities will be followed by an investigation of national, transnational, and intercultural relations.

*Monitoring of the Country in Relation to Rights and Representation of Muslim Communities* covers the final section of the factsheet. It contains two sub-parts: monitoring of the rights and freedoms of Muslim communities and the monitoring of visibility and representation of Muslim communities. In the former, political, religious and cultural, educational, and civil rights and freedoms are analyzed; in the latter information is gathered on the visibility of Muslims in written media, public discussions, and national academia.

Factsheets examined secondary data under below subtitles and details:

- (I) **Historical Background of Muslim Migration to Predominantly Non-Muslim Countries:** There is great diversity in the historical background of Muslims in the countries examined. The nature of the diversity is due to a number of different factors, the most important of which are the development level of the country, which directly affects the living standards of the migrated Muslims, the start date/era of Muslim migration into the countries examined, the “hospitality” of the host country, *i.e.*, the official trends on multiculturalism, which hindered or encouraged the Muslim migration. Although these factors play a significant role on



Muslim migration, they fail to provide solid patterns/correlations by themselves. More economic development does not necessarily bring more Muslim migrants. Regarding countries development levels, due to their welfare economics and well-established social security schemes first tier countries have received more Muslim migrants. For second tier countries development level also remains an important criterion. The standard of living relying on the development level had an impact on Muslim migration. For the third tier, the European Union (EU) membership of Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had a similar impact on the number of Muslims aiming to migrate into the EU zone. The level of economic development does not appear discernible as a determining factor for the fourth tier countries.

- (II) **Legal and Political Context:** In much the same way as the aforementioned historical background of Muslim migration, the legal and political context is equally multifaceted. One major criterion in the legal and political context is multiculturalism, which does not conform to a single definition or application. Some countries leave multiculturalism as an official statement and do not give a constitutional status, such as the USA. Others made multiculturalism a centrepiece of their migration policies. Multiculturalism does not necessarily mean that Muslim specific laws and regulations are accepted or valid in these countries. With the exception of the confines of education, none of these countries accept Sharia law or practices within their official apparatus.
  
- (III) **Socio-economic Context:** Four-tiered country segregation of the Muslim diaspora makes greater sense under this title since developed and well-functioning economic and social structures attracted more Muslim migrants. The secondary research for the factsheet failed to provide reliable data on the sectors or annual salaries of Muslim migrants, since in most countries it is not easy to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims in several sectors. On the other hand it would not be wrong to say that in many first, second and third tier countries Muslims suffer greater unemployment as well as discrimination in their applications to official/bureaucratic positions. Muslims are also found to generally work in less-skill required sectors, i.e. delivery, small food chains or transportation. What is clear is the socio-economic organization of Muslims. Muslims in first tier countries are largely organized under the 'umbrella' of several types of Councils, Associations and Foundations. In second tier countries similar organizations are operating. In third and fourth tier countries the size of Muslim communities has some bearing on Muslims' social status particularly due to their *etablis* status. Muslims' social status and progress is defined by a number of aspects including

educational attainment, income, occupational status and homeownership together with residential locale and intermarriage.

Regarding Muslim communities' profiles the following subtitles provided the analysis

- a. **Demography:** The number of Muslims in the countries examined does not show a correlation with the total population size. In first tier countries the Muslims population ranges from 1% of the population to 3.2%. For example, despite the population size being one of the largest, the number of Muslims in the US is somewhere around 3,5 million, comprising around 1% of the population. However, in Canada they comprise the second largest religious group. Migration origins to first tier countries are generally from Asia and Africa with a weighted average from India, Pakistan, Iran, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Afghanistan, and sub-Saharan Africa. For the European first tier, former Yugoslavia and Albania also comprise big sources of Muslim immigration. Regarding age distribution, the Muslim population generally younger than the non-Muslim population, particularly in host countries such as Canada, France, Austria, and Germany. For a comprehensive review including the estimated Muslim diaspora populations in a larger number of countries in 2010, please see section Tables and Graphs.
- b. **Socio-Economic Life:** As stated in the socio-economic context well-functioning economic and social structures attracted larger numbers of Muslim migrants. Regarding Muslims monthly/yearly revenues the secondary research could not provide reliable data. What is certain is that the high unemployment level and discrimination Muslims face in job applications. Unemployment figures in this sense were used to provide an objective indicator of Muslims' economic situations. In second tier countries the unemployment rate of Muslims is, on average, higher than that in the first tier. Due to the small number of Muslims for the for the third and fourth tier, a similar situation applies regarding the unavailability of secondary data on Muslim-oriented unemployment rates, i.e. for the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Chile, Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, Moldova and Colombia.
- c. **Education:** The general profile of the education of Muslims is largely related to the multiculturalist tendencies of the countries at stake. Muslims from Commonwealth countries in each tier generally have a higher education profile than those of other tier countries. Muslims are also underrepresented in high-status professional occupations and overrepresented in other occupational categories, which tend to have

lower status. In first tier non-Commonwealth countries Muslims' educational profiles and attainment are scattered. Regarding the second tier, mostly, the civic engagement of young Muslims is fostered through charity programs, educational measures are provided on personal skills as well as on religious teachings, together with help with their implementation in the everyday life of young Muslims. For third and fourth tier countries, due to the significant lower numbers of Muslims, secondary data did not provide comprehensive and reliable information about Muslim's education profile. In these countries religious education in public schools is optional and non-denominational: pupils are introduced to various faith traditions, though the general context is Christian due to the country's historical and cultural background. In some of countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Malta, Romania, Liechtenstein, Moldova) occasional modules on world religions, including Islam, are integrated into the national education system.

- d. **Political Participation, Representation and Visibility:** The tiered classification is appropriate under this title since political participation and media visibility have a decreasing significance from tier one to tier four. In first tier countries, political participation has been increasing. In first tier countries, many Muslims directly participate in the political environment via their parties. Political participation in second tier countries is related to both Muslims' numbers and their education level. Political participation entails a certain level of inclusion; a person will not participate if they do not belong. In the pursuit of a multiethnic society, governmental multiculturalism policies have socially isolated Muslim ethnic groups. Secondary data on the Muslim political participation in third and fourth tier countries is not viable and reliable. Regarding media visibility, in both first and second tier countries; the image of Muslims' is not particularly positive. For the third and fourth tier countries the political representation and media visibility depends on the size of Muslim communities.
- e. **Rights and Freedoms:** In first tier countries, in line with their more multicultural tendencies, freedom of religious expression is higher than those from the second and third tier. Although first tier countries do not apply the same level/types of rights and freedoms, the general framework of rights and freedoms concern religious expression/practice and opposing religious discrimination. In first tier countries the rights and freedoms of Muslims are also affected by their experiences with legislative and administrative processes. Second tier countries, and particularly those Western countries that are less migration-oriented, show more implications of Islamophobia. In third and fourth tier countries, regardless

of the size of Muslim community, there are greater tendencies for Islamophobic and racist statements.

- f. **Religious Organizations and Institutions:** In first tier countries, Muslim organizations have greater flexibility, particularly regarding religious practice. For example in Canada there are more than 200 mosques. In France, there were 2,449 prayer rooms and mosques in 2012. In Italy there were 749 mosques as of 2013. In Russia the number was 1382 in 2013, which rose from 300 in 1991. In the USA this number is over 2,100. For second tier countries these numbers decrease significantly. In Australia there are 28 mosques and as a radical example in Argentina the number is only 3, all in Buenos Aires. In third tier countries the number of mosques is proportionate to the size of the Muslim community. In Bulgaria there are 1,217 mosques. In the Czech Republic there are only 4 mosques. In fourth tier countries, the numbers of mosques are less. In New Zealand, there are less than 50 mosques, in Chile 3, in Colombia 18, in Iceland 1, in South Korea 13, in Costa Rica 2. Another significant component of religious institutions can be found in the realm of education. Regarding this aspect in first tier countries, over 40% Muslims have a University degree, higher than the national average. Some second tier countries, like Australia, have a significant number of migrants and Muslims' level of educational attainment compares favorably with the total population. Islamic education in these countries is also generally well organized with several education institutions operating at various levels. For the third and fourth tiers the place of Muslim education institutions depends on the size of the Muslim community.

## b. FIELDWORK FINDINGS

- *Diaspora Experiences Depend Heavily on the National Context:* How the different Muslim communities organize their lives, perceive the outer world, and form their relationship with their various collective identities, e.g. being a Muslim, Pakistani, British, immigrant, Berliner depend heavily on the historical background, dominant political ideology, legal system, and socio-economic context of the respective country context.

- *"A Muslim Diaspora"?:* Overall, a majority of the participants in this study do not believe that it is proper to talk about the existence of a Muslim diaspora- due mostly to perceived negative implications of the concept (i.e. diaspora implies foreignness, we are not foreign!); while the transnational Muslim identity is suggested to be a unifying referent for all Muslims around the globe.

- ***A Main Concern of Muslim Diasporic Communities is the Lack of Unity and Representation:*** All representatives, spokespersons, individuals, leaders, and organizations of the Muslim communities spoken to agreed on and voiced the fact that the over-fragmentation and the lack of intra-communal and inter-communal interaction is the greatest problem of the larger Muslim community across Europe.

- ***Although Lack of an Effective Leadership is Considered as a Major Problem, No Short-Term Solution is Seen as Likely:*** Finding a solution to this problem is not seen to be easy because of the immense diversity of the Muslim communities in the diaspora: “who will represent whom, how, and for what” are considered by Muslim individuals to be very difficult questions to answer.

- ***Common Challenges Bring Muslims in Europe Together:*** Negative representation in media, the surge in far-right politics, and the rise in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim incidents in Europe bring Muslim communities closer and might be signaling the emergence of a Muslim identity unified as a reaction to such negative experiences.

- ***Everyday Discrimination and Violation of Rights:*** Although the general frameworks of rights and freedoms in fieldwork countries are considered to be very good and liberal by the Muslims, they still report experiencing discrimination as Muslims in their daily life at various levels and in various degrees of intensity.

- ***Muslim Diasporic Communities are Mostly Led by First-Generation Immigrants Today, Second-Generation Muslims Will Soon Replace Them:*** The leaders of the Muslim communities across Europe are predominantly from the first-generation Muslims who were born in another country and moved to Europe as adults. The second and third generation Muslims are increasingly more prominent amongst Muslim communities and this will change the landscape of Muslim diaspora because they:

- have much better command of the host country language (which is the first language for some) and are more familiar with the system,
- are much better integrated to their respective host countries, enabling them to develop a different perspective on their Muslim identities,
- are much better connected with other ethnic and cultural groups in the host country,
- are much more adept to embrace multiple identities and code various identities to be complementary to one another instead of seeing them as mutually exclusive,
- have a wider vision and global outlook as they are more prone to interact with the outer world.

- *Host Countries are Working to Promote a Localization and Vernacularization of Islam in their Countries:* In line with the advent of the better integrated second-generation Muslims, host country governments appear to promote the creation of a localized and “vernacular” Islam: one which is seen to be less open to outside intervention, more modern and more compatible with the life of young Muslims in these countries.

- *The Process of Localization and Vernacularization of Islam in the Diaspora Seems Inevitable and not something to be avoided:* There are mosques that use multiple languages in their services as well as those which only use the host language, which aims to bring together Muslim individuals from different ethnic and national backgrounds.

- *The Muslim Diasporic Communities are Optimistic about Their Future:* A large majority of Muslims in diaspora are optimistic and confident about their future: number of Muslims will increase and their position and significance in Europe will grow. There are also some who are concerned about the rising Islamophobia and far-right political movements.

## 5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of this study, as well as the discussion and analysis below policy recommendations were proposed.

- *Strengthening the Sense of Unity amongst Members of the Global Muslim Diaspora:* While it may not be possible to talk about the existence of a single Global Muslim Diaspora today, it was clear that Muslim communities do share a significant common identity that could be argued to warrant using the term diaspora. Many respondents of the fieldworks did, in fact, suggest that they consider themselves as members of a global Muslim community, the *Ummah*. Beyond the matter of terminology, moreover, it appears plausible that this sense of sharing the common identity of being Muslim could be strengthened. It appears that there are three major ways in supporting the sense of unity among diaspora Muslims:

- Firstly, the sense of unity among diaspora Muslims could be strengthened through emphasizing their commonalities and similarities with other Muslims, rather than differences and peculiarities. Moreover, policy-makers should avoid imposing their own vision of the ‘True Islam’, or the correct or authentic way of life for Muslims. This may serve to alienate some groups and prevent a number of individuals from identifying themselves as members of one Muslim identity.

- Secondly, the strength of an identity increases when it faces a strong rival/other identity or hostility from outside. It was found that this is the case for the Muslim identity for many individuals in the diaspora in the context of rising populism, xenophobia, anti-immigration sentiments and Islamophobia. These large international trends, which are prevalent in even the most liberal democracies, create an increased sense of solidarity amongst members of various Muslim communities in the diaspora. Therefore, policies that aim to strengthen the sense of unity amongst Muslim communities need to emphasize the fight against common challenges of discrimination and Islamophobia. This should be done carefully so as not to adopt an antagonistic language fostering hatred and fear, but a language that highlights the value of working together with other Muslim communities as well as non-Muslim communities to counter prejudice, injustice, and discrimination.
- Thirdly, places of congregation could be utilized for bolstering the unity among Muslims. Mosques should emphasize country/community specific issues Muslim communities face and can contribute in their resolution, i.e. education and media visibility. Mosques should also focus on non-sectarian narratives in a way to prevent the compartmentalization of Muslim identity.
  - *Developing Muslim communities' Institutions/Organizations:* The secondary and the primary research show that Muslim institutions operate in three major realms: education, media, and religious practice. To increase the integrity of Muslim diaspora the institutions in all these realms should go through structural developments.
    - For education, more promotion should be carried out by the Muslim countries to open and contribute to the functioning of better quality primary and secondary schools for younger Muslim generations in non-Muslim countries.
    - Media realm needs to be in the centre of focus in order to highlight the peaceful, loving and universally embracing nature of Islam. Media organizations in non-Muslim countries are suffering from Islamophobic tendencies of non-Muslim media. Therefore the components of Muslim media streams need to emphasize modern, universal and humanitarian narratives of Islam rather than otherness.
    - In religious practice, mosques need better administration in both finances and engaging with various ethnic Muslim communities. Particularly for the latter there need to be an increase in efforts on

translation services in religious services since many members of the Muslim community does not speak the language of the country they migrated.

- *Engaging Muslim Communities in the Diaspora:* Muslim communities living across non-Muslim countries are increasingly being organized through civil society organizations and wish to be able to communicate and cooperate with national and international actors.

- Any policy-maker wishing to engage the Muslim communities in the diaspora needs to consider these communities as active agents with well-articulated interests, demands, and agendas; rather than passive subjects. In fact, it was repeatedly stated that many well-intentioned and generously funded projects and programs failed because they did not properly engage with the Muslim communities. In other words, formulating and implementing projects that would supposedly benefit the Muslim communities without having these communities included in the preparation and planning phases, and contributing in the implementation phase has proven to not function effectively.
- Another crucial consideration when engaging the Muslim communities in the diaspora is to take their immense diversity into account. This is essential in two ways: on the one hand, any initiative that is perceived to belong to or targets a single community will significantly narrow down its appeal among members of the other groups. On the other hand, trying to embrace too wider participation, such projects and programs would be putting different Muslim communities in a context of competition with one another.
- Finally, for any program that aims to engage Muslim communities in the diaspora effective and positive communication is crucial. Muslim communities need to be included in all aspects and stages of the process through healthy communication and effective coordination mechanisms.

- *Engaging Different Stakeholders:* Muslim communities in the diaspora occupy a central position in terms of national and international politics. Therefore, effective policies concerning these communities require the engagement of diverse actors, particularly the host country's national and local governments. Smooth social, economic and political integration of Muslim diasporic communities, a peaceful multicultural cohabitation, and intercultural dialogue are all common objectives for



the receiving governments, sending governments, as well as local, national and international NGOs.

- *Engaging with other ethnic and religious minorities:* In addition to the stakeholders other ethnic and religious elements of the host society could improve Muslim diaspora's position and influence. Collaborating with these would raise awareness on the non-Muslim society's own biases and create a block of universal resistance that cannot be put off to the side as a "mere Muslim agenda" but looks more like a human rights discourse, which mainly the "West" claims to represent

- *Focusing on the Education of the Muslim Youth:* Both the general education profile and Islamic education in all tier countries should be increased regardless of the level of multiculturalism. This would contribute to both Muslims' more comprehensive integration into various sectors and also, indirectly, their influence in the society. Muslim countries should be encouraged to open and develop Muslim and Islamic world related research centers in the universities and encourage Muslim and non-Muslim students to carry out post-graduate studies on Islam world-related subjects.

- *Representation of Muslim communities:* A very significant fact, emphasized several times in this study, is the diversity of the Muslim diaspora even in the same country. Therefore a very limited number of representational elements (political parties, social clubs/groups) as seen in several non-Muslim countries could only have a limited scope of representation. There needs to be a consortium of representational bodies within the national sphere. In order to deal with potential difficulties in the administering of such a consortium, a national council from the opinion leaders of several ethnic groups could also be organized. Such a body could communicate with the host society about complexities and richness of the heterogeneity of the Muslim diaspora.

Representation should not be only political. It has to be social and humanitarian. A very significant result of the primary and secondary research within this study asserts the counter productive results of the oppression of religious freedoms. A better and more comprehensive representation of Muslim rights and freedoms could also raise the awareness of the host society about the current and further/potential troubles of such oppression in the future.

- *Raising Awareness:* Policies and initiatives that aim to raise awareness concerning the Muslim identity would be highly beneficial for Muslim communities in the diaspora. Particularly, awareness should be raised that Muslim identity is not an obstacle for the integration of immigrants and Muslim minorities. One of the most significant findings of this study is that members of Muslim diasporic communities do find a contradiction between their Muslim identities and their sense of belonging to the United Kingdom or Germany. This is in stark contrast with the argument that Muslim immigrants are generally unable to integrate into non-Muslim societies. The

demonstrable fallacy of this argument needs to be highlighted in the eyes of relevant stakeholders as well as the wider groupings of host country society and Muslim communities everywhere.

- ***The Youth are the Future- Targeting Second and Further Generations:*** There is an obvious generational difference between the first and second/third generations regarding their integration, language competency levels and their less introvert profiles. The second generation has less organic links with their migrant ethnic and national identities. In other words, they have hybridized identities which strengthen their communication patterns with other Muslim communities together as well as non-Muslim communities.

To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Muslim youth their ghettoization should be prevented. Their integration should be encouraged without losing Muslim values. To achieve this, the youth's awareness should be raised about potential social risks threatening Muslim identity and values. In this respect, there is a clear need for programs and training for parents (of first or second generation) to enable new generation about these risks of integration, which might end up with assimilation.

For a more global integration of the Muslim youth scholarship programs could be useful to synergize their efforts worldwide. A good example could be encouraging scholars to study the impacts of BREXIT on attitudes towards migrants and Muslim migrants particularly. Equally, more primary research should be done on the socio-cultural problems Muslims face via social projects rather than political.

- ***Embracing the Vernacularization and Localization of Islam in the Diaspora:*** The diversity of Islamic understanding and practices need to be recognized better. In other words, Islam, without sacrificing any of its core foundations and practice, could be presented in a way more appropriate to the cultural codes of the Muslim and non-Muslim elements of society. Such a presentation could enable better acknowledgement of Islam in the socio-psychological realm. The utilization of multiple languages in the Mosque services could attract Muslims from different ethnic communities. An alternative could be using several large screens at Mosque services streaming hutba and other announcements. Computer based or mobile applications (facebook, whatsapp etc.) could convey communication among various Muslim communities in multiple languages.

For the establishment the academic foundations of such vernacularization, Muslim communities need their own scholars within theology departments, special chairs could be organized to research the extent of diversification of Islam from country/society to country/society.

- ***Contributing to the Healthy Representation and Coverage of the Muslim Diaspora:*** For less stereotypical presentations of Muslims in the national and international media, policy advisory bodies, like Brookings and Carnegie, should be

established to work on Islamic world events, members, changes, and also the core doctrines of Islam. Their work should be supported by the academic emphasis of the relevant theology and sociology departments/research centers. These institutions have role to play in presenting Islam in a positive manner to non-Muslim communities.

Rather than conventional media, a serious focus should be placed upon social media, particularly for non-Muslim youth. In parallel, serious measures should be taken against the websites and other online sources that encourage Islamic radicalization.

▪ ***Counter-Islamophobia measures:*** Essentially, Islamophobic tendencies are the result of the lack of basic knowledge on Islam and Muslim practices. These tendencies can turn into institutionalized forms of racism targeting Muslims in the fields of employment, education, state bureaucracy, and the media. In countering the fundamentals of Islamophobia there is a need for the introduction of more comparative religion courses, or teachings, in formal and informal educational settings. Strengthening Muslim NGOs would be a useful contribution to the legitimization of Muslims, as well as raising public awareness on human rights and freedom of religion.

Muslim rights' violations need to be documented and enhanced by the Islamic community. The Muslim community may help raise better registration and prosecution to reduce hate crimes against Muslims Muslim country governments, in general, could provide workshops and specific briefings for the implications of discrimination to a variety of professional groups, including health professionals, staff in all sectors of education, public administration, the police, the criminal justice system, journalists etc. They could also extend risk assessment mechanisms and police presence for refugee accommodation and facilities of Islamic worship.

To aid EU countries, Muslim countries should also carry out political initiatives for extending national and regional anti-discrimination laws, legislate specifically for legal protection from discrimination in public services, law enforcement, education and welfare provision, and adopt and adjust protection from religious discrimination in line with European Union laws.

• ***Developing inter-state contacts between Muslim and non-Muslim countries on above-stated recommendations:*** Muslim states', in other words the sending countries', official apparatus should be in touch with their Muslim diaspora elements. They need to consider revising their strategy for working with Muslim opinion leaders in the host country to be aware of the problems the above-stated recommendations addressing. Being in touch with host country's official apparatus regarding these problems would also keep the awareness of the host fresh and open.

## 6. STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table 1: European Muslims: European Countries with the largest Muslim Population

	Muslim population	Largest ethnic Muslim groups	Inner Islamic groups	Geographical Spread	Number of Mosques	Islamic Education and Learning
Austria	-573,876 (6.8% of population in 2012). -600,000 (6.9% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report Europe's Growing Muslim Population)	Turkish: 21.2% Bosnian: 10.1% Montenegrin, Serbian, Kosovoar: 6.7% Russian: 3.6% Macedonian: 2.7%	Majority Sunni estimated around 80%, a sizeable Alevi community from Turkey estimated at 10-20%, and roughly 1% from countries with a Shi'i majority population.	Mostly in in the Northern states on the German border, with 38% or 216,345 in the capital Vienna alone. 30% live in the states of Upper and Lower Austria.	205 registered mosques and several hundred non-registered prayer rooms.	-Academy for Muslim Religious Education (IRPA) -Private Degree Programme in continuing religious education for Muslims (IHL) -University of Vienna, Institute for Islamic Studies -Al-Andalus Elementary and Middle School -Austrian International Schools Vienna, AISV -Avicenna Elementary School -Isma Muhamed Asad Comprehensive School
Belgium	-716,478 (6.5% of entire population in 2013) -870,000 (7.6% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report Europe's Growing Muslim Population)	Moroccan: 332,224 (46.4% of Muslim population) Turkish: 179,558 (25.8%) Other: 204,696 (27.8%).	Sunni majority at around 80%, Shi'is are estimated at 10%, Alevis are also present.	Brussels Capital Region: 40% Flemish Region: 39% Walloon Region: 21%.120	294 (81 officially recognised). Brussels Capital Region: 68 (14 officially recognised). Flemish Region: 151 (28 officially recognised). Walloon Region: 75 (39 officially recognised).	-Association ECIB has launched a nursery and primary schools in the Brussels Capital Region: Al Ghazali (Eterbeek), La Plume (Molenbeek), La Vertu (Schaerbeek) Other (unrecognised institutions) -European Islamic Institute (IIE), linked to the Centre Islamique et Culturel de Belgique and the Muslim World League -Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles (FSIB), -Alkhayria Belgica
Bulgaria	-577,139 (7.8% of population in 2011) -790,000 (11.1% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report Europe's Growing Muslim Population)	Turkish: 444,434 (more than 85% of Muslim population) Pomak: 67,350 (app. 6%) Roma: 42,201 (4%) Arab: 10,000 Tatar: 5,000	Sunni: 546,004 Shi'i: 27,407 Neutral: 59,3,727.	Turkish Muslims in Kardzhali, Razgrad, Targovishte, Shumen, Silistra, Dobrich Ruse, Burgas, Roma Muslims are distributed in all districts, especially in Montana, Silven, Dobrich, and Yambol. Pomaks mainly in the Rhodope region and Gotse Delchev district.	1,500 active (400 constructed after 1990); around 30 under construction; 118 not in use.	- Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia - Religious High School Nuvvab - Religious High School— Russe - Religious High School— Momchilgrad - Scientific Research Centre at the Higher Islamic Institute

Denmark	<p>-263,800 (4.7% of population as of 1 January 2015)          -310,000 (5.4% of population according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>Turkish: 21.5%, Iraqi: 10.0%, Lebanese: 9.3%, Pakistani: 8.7%, Somali: 7.4%, Afghan: 6.3%, Bosnian: 4.9%, Syrian: 4.8%, Iranian: 4.1%, Moroccan: 4.0%          Other: 19.0%</p>	<p>According to a 2008 survey (conducted among Pakistanis, Iraqis, Iranians, Turks, Somalis, the former Yugoslavia and Palestinians): 45% Sunnis, 11% Shi'is, and 23% "Islam, other," may include Ahmadis (around 0.4%), Alevi (around 2.5%)</p>	<p>47.4% of the Muslim population in Denmark is concentrated in Greater Copenhagen (Storkøbenhavn): 9.4% of the Muslim population lives in Aarhus, while 5.5% of the Muslim population reside in Odense.</p>	<p>Around 140 (ten of them are Shi'i mosques and two of them Ahmadi mosques).</p>	<p>-The Islamic-Christian Study Centre          -Most mosques and Muslim associations provide some form of Islamic instruction outside school hours (Qur'anic schools).</p>
France	<p>-The estimates by Ministry of the Interior based on country of origin range between 2.4 million, and 4 to 5 million -5,720,000 (8.8% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>A majority of French Muslims come from the Maghreb area (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). There are also a number of Turks, and of people originating from sub-Saharan African countries (Senegal, Cameroon).</p>	<p>The majority of Muslims in France are Sunnis following the Maliki School. Other Sunnis are mainly Turkish and Pakistani Hanafis. There are also Turkish Alevi, and some Senegalese Sufi brotherhoods.</p>	<p>The highest concentration of Muslims can be found in the region around Paris (Muslims are more than 10% of the population in the departments of Val d'Oise, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val de Marne); they are also found in the region of Lyon and Bouches-du-Rhone, and in the Eastern part of France.</p>	<p>The Ministry of the Interior counts 2,449 places of worship (2,131 for metropolitan France) in 2012. Only 90 are purpose-built mosques.</p>	<p>Currently, there are around 30 Muslim primary schools in France, most of which are private schools. The secondary school Averroes in Lille (opened in 2003) is under state contract; the Al Kindi secondary school of Lyon-Decines is partially under state contract. Other secondary schools La Reussite, in Aubervilliers, Ibn Khaldun, Marseille, Montigny-le-Bretonneux, have not obtained such a contract.</p>
Germany	<p>-3.8-4.3 million (4.6-5.2 % of the total population in 2009).          -4,950,000 (6.1% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>Turkish: 63.2%          Southeast European: 13.6%          Middle Eastern: 8.1%          North African: 6.9%          South and South-eastern Asian: 4.6%, Iranian: 1.7%          Sub-Saharan African: 1.5%          Central Asian/ CIS: 0.4%</p>	<p>Sunnis: 74.1%          Alevi: 12.7%          Shi'is: 7.1%          Ahmadis: 1.7%          Ibadis: 0.3%          Sufis: 0.1%          Others: 4.0%</p>	<p>Baden-Württemberg: 16.6%          Bavaria: 13.2%          Berlin: 6.9%          Hamburg: 3.5%          Hesse: 10.3%          Lower Saxony: 6.2%          North Rhine-Westphalia: 33.1%          Rhineland-Palatinate: 4.0%</p>	<p>Around 2,350 (including Alevi Cem houses), 2,179 of them have an imam (or dede for Alevi).</p>	<p>-Since 2011, four centres of Islamic Theology at six universities: Erlangen-Nürnberg, Frankfurt with Gießen, Münster/Osnabrück, Tübingen with the support of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research.          At the Pädagogische Hochschule Weingarten, Alevi Religious Studies have been offered since 2011.          -Since 1995, there is a private state-recognised Islamic primary school in Berlin.</p>

Greece	<p>-Approx. 390,000 (unofficial estimate) (3.5% of total population)</p> <p>-620,000 (5.7% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>(Greek nationals)</p> <p>Turkish: 80,000</p> <p>Pomak: 15,000</p> <p>Roma: 10,000</p> <p>(non-Greek nationals)</p> <p>South Asian: 100,000</p> <p>Middle Eastern: 120,000</p> <p>Other: 50,000</p>	<p>No official data available. Sunni Islam is the most widespread form of Islam. Shi'i Islam is far less widespread, Alevism is found mostly among Turks and Kurds.</p>	<p>Muslims with Greek citizenship residing in Greece (in total about 105,000) are mainly concentrated in Thrace (about 85,000), in Athens and Thessaloniki, and on Rhodes and Kos. More than 40% of the Muslim population is concentrated in the greater Athens metropolitan area.</p>	<p>Around 300 mosques in Thrace, two on Kos and one on Rhodes are officially registered as mosques, more than 90 unofficial prayer houses function in greater Athens (also in Thessaloniki and other cities).</p>	<p>In Thrace (related to minority Muslims)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- all minority schools (elementary and secondary);</li> <li>- madrasa (secondary school) of Komotini;</li> <li>- madrasa (secondary school) of Elinos;</li> <li>- <i>Kuran kursu</i> offered privately in a series of villages and city neighbourhoods.</li> </ul>
Italy	<p>- 1,650,902 (foreign residents, <i>Caritas Migrants</i> (2012).</p> <p>1,360,000 (foreign residents + 115,000 Italian citizens, CESNUR 2012).</p> <p>-2,870,000 (4.8% of population in 2016, according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>Moroccan, Albanian, Tunisian, Egyptian, Senegalese, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Macedonian, and Algerian</p>	<p>No official data available. The majority of Muslim organisations are Sunni.</p>	<p>Concentrations in the urban areas in the North of Italy (especially Lombardia and the district of Milan) but also in the South, depending on the presence of foreign residents.</p>	<p>655 to 749, based on different estimates, although only few of them are registered and purpose-built</p>	<p>None exist.</p>
Netherlands	<p>-825,000 (4.9% of entire population in 2014).</p> <p>-1,210,000 (7.1% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>38% Turkish,</p> <p>31% Moroccan, 26% other Asian /African,</p> <p>4% European (Non-Dutch)</p> <p>4.5% Pakistani,</p> <p>3.5% Surinamese, 3.5% Afghani,</p> <p>3% Iraqi.</p>	<p>The Muslim population includes Sunnis, Shi'is, Alevis and Ahmadis. In the Turkish-Dutch group, 7% identify themselves as Alevi. Shi'i Muslims in the Netherlands are mainly part of the Iranian diaspora (81% of the Iranian-Dutch).</p>	<p>Most Muslims live in the Western part of the Netherlands, in particular in the provinces Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Utrecht and Flevoland.</p>	<p>Around 453 mosques in the Netherlands (around 100 purpose built). Turkish-Dutch: Dyanet: 140; Milli Gorus: 35; Suleymancis: 38</p> <p>Moroccan-Dutch mosques: 150; Surinamese-Dutch: World Islamic Mission: 25</p> <p>Ahmadyya: 5; Others (including Somali-Dutch): 62</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fahm Institute (<i>Fahm Instituut</i>); Al Islah Foundation; Al Fitrah Foundation (Salafi oriented);</li> <li>Avicenna College (the only secondary Islamic school in the Netherlands. Mixed ethnic groups but mainly Moroccan-Dutch; Islamic University of Rotterdam (Islamitische Universiteit Rotterdam, a Sunni oriented and Suleymanci dominated institute of higher learning. Its Islamic Theology and Islamic Chaplaincy education are recognised by the Dutch Ministry of Education as higher vocational studies.)</li> <li>Public institutions: Centre for Islamic Theology (<i>Centrum voor Islamitische Theologie</i> – CIT, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculty of Theology)</li> </ul>

Norway	-132,000-220,000 (2.6-4.5% of population in 2014). -300,000 (5.7% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)	Somali: 35,912; Pakistani: 34,447 Iraqi: 30,144; Iranian: 20,320 Turkish: 17,608; Bosnian: 17,161 Afghan: 16,320; Kosovo-Albanian: 14,715; Moroccan: 9,396	No specific data. It is assumed that around 20% of Muslims in Norway are Shi'i and 80% are Sunni Muslims. There is also a small Ahmadiyya community, around 1,500 people in 2010.	Largely an urban Muslim population, with the greatest concentration of Muslims found in and around the capital of Oslo, and in larger urban centres mainly in Eastern Norway, but also in Stavanger in Western Norway and Kristiansand in Southern Norway.	Around 130-140	There are at present no Islamic primary or secondary schools in Norway.
Russia	-16-20 million (12%-15% of population).	Tatar: 20.3% Bashkir: 6.0% Chechen: 5.5% Avar: 3.5% Kazakh: 2.5% Azerbaijani: 2.3% Dargin: 2.3% Other: 57.6 %	The majority of Russia's Muslims follow Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, mainly the Hanafi and Shafi'i. Shi'is are a small minority to be found almost exclusively in the Caucasus, among Azerbaijanis and their diaspora.	Ethnic Muslims are predominant in 7 republics of the Russian Federation: Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod and St Petersburg also have significant Muslim populations.	Around 7,200 (the majority of them in the Volga-Urals and North Caucasus regions).	- Moscow Islamic University ( <i>Moskovskiy Islamskiy Universitet</i> ) - Russian Islamic University, Kazan ( <i>Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet</i> ), -Russian Islamic University, Ufa ( <i>Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet</i> ), -Moscow Spiritual Islamic College - Muhammadiyah Madrasa in Kazan, -Mahinur Madrasa in Nizhniy Novgorod, -Imeni M. Sultanovoi Madrasa in Ufa, - Galiya Madrasa in Ufa, -Nur al-Iman Madrasa in Sterlitamak
Serbia	-222,828 (3.1% of population in 2011 Census)	65% of Muslims in Serbia are Bosniaks. The other 35% are Romas, Muslims by nationality 18 and Serbian Muslims.	No official data available. Estimates provided by Twelver Shi'i communities in Serbia suggest that there are 100-200 Shi'is in Serbia.	Around 80% of the Muslim population live in the Sandžak region. Around 15% of the Muslim population is based in Belgrade.	Around 195 (130 of them are in Sandžak, 60 in Preševo Valley and the remaining in Belgrade, Subotica, Šabac, Niš and Mali Zvornik).	The ICIS (Islamic Community in Serbia) and ICoS (Islamic Community of Serbia) two main Islamic organisations in Serbia have parallel school systems. Within the ICoS there is the Nahla preschool, a madrasa called Sinan Bey in Novi Pazar, and a women's madrasa called Bakija Hanume in Prijepeje as well as the Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Belgrade. The ICIS runs a preschool and mekteb called Reuda and Wildan, a madrasa in Novi Pazar called Gazi Isa Bey, and the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Novi Pazar.

Spain	<p>- 1,541,673 (3.3% of population in 2014).</p> <p>- 1,180,000 (2.6% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>Moroccan: 74.1%</p> <p>Pakistani: 6.8%</p> <p>Algerian: 5.5%</p> <p>Senegalese: 5.3%</p> <p>Malian: 2.1%</p> <p>Gambian: 1.8%</p> <p>Bangladeshi: 1.1%</p> <p>Mauritanian: 0.9%, Egyptian: 0.3%, Iranian: 0.2%, Other: 1.9%</p>	<p>No official data available. The majority of Muslims in Spain are Sunnis.</p>	<p>The Muslim presence extends throughout Spain. The three regions with its largest presence are Catalonia, Madrid and Andalusia.</p>	<p>1,312 (14 of them are major Muslim centres).</p>	<p>Educa Islam—Created in 2012 by the <i>Junta Islámica</i>, a distance learning centre dedicated to the teaching of Islam in its different dimensions. Some of the courses offered are academically recognised by the University Carlos III of Madrid. Umm al-Qura School—The only Islamic school in Spain, which forms part of the Madrid Islamic Cultural Centre complex. It provides pre-school, primary, and secondary education. The school was recognised by the Spanish state in April 1998 and has around 400 students and 30 teachers.</p>
Sweden	<p>-350,000–400,000 (if not higher, could be closer to 500,000. Up to 5% of the entire population).</p> <p>-810,000 (8.1% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>No data available. Sweden consists of large groups of Turks, Arabs (from Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc.), Somalis, Iranians, and Bosnians.</p>	<p>No data available.</p>	<p>The large majority (most likely over 50%) of Muslims live in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö.</p>	<p>There are seven purpose-built mosques in Sweden (five Sunni mosques, in Malmö, Uppsala, Göteborg, and two in Stockholm, one Shi'i mosque in Trollhattan, and one Ahmadi mosque in Göteborg).</p>	<p>In 2010, the number of confessional independent schools was estimated at 68, of which nine were Islamic. There are no institutions of higher Islamic learning, or madrassas in Sweden.</p>
Switzerland	<p>-328,011 (5% of population in 2012).</p> <p>-510,000 (6.1% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)</p>	<p>Balkans: 43%</p> <p>Turkish (including Alevis): 16%</p> <p>North African: 5%</p> <p>Sub-Saharan African: 1%</p> <p>Middle Eastern: 4%</p>	<p>Muslims in Switzerland are 80% Sunnis, 7% Shi'is, and 8–11% Turkish Alevis. The residual percentage includes minority community members such as members of the Ahmadiyya movement and of Sufi orders.</p>	<p>The Muslim population is established in every region of Switzerland:          – German speaking region (77%)          – French speaking region (21.4%)          – Italian speaking region (1.6%).</p>	<p>240–250. Only four mosques show features of Islamic architecture, in particular, a minaret: Zurich (run by the Ahmadiyya movement), Geneva (financed by Saudi Arabia), and more recently in two converted industrial buildings in Winterthur (2005, run by ethnic Albanians) and Wangen (2009, run by ethnic Turks)</p>	<p>Islamic education for children in Switzerland is dispensed in Qur'an classes organised by the mosque associations or, less frequently, on an entirely private basis. Islamic education in public schools is found in very few municipalities (Kriens and Ebikon, canton of Lucerne, since 2003. Kreuzlingen, canton of Thurgau, since 2010). The Swiss Centre on Islam and Society (SCIS) founded in 2014, offers courses aiming at self-reflective Muslim learning and dialogue for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.</p>
Ukraine	<p>-600,000 (1.4% out of total population in 2014).</p>	<p>Crimean Tatars (around 300,000), Volga Tatars (70,000), Azerbaijanis (50,000), and others (Chechens, Dagestanis, Turks, Iranians, Arabs, and Uzbeks)</p>	<p>Sunnis (mostly Hanafi) constitute the absolute majority. Twelver Shi'is are relatively small in number, not exceeding 20,000.</p>	<p>Around 50% of Ukrainian Muslims live in Crimea; more than 30% live in Kiev and Eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk), around 20% in other regions.</p>	<p>Around 400 (including more than 300 on Crimea).</p>	<p>– Al-Hrshad Islamic School and University          – Al-Nur Islamic School          – Azov Medrese of Islamic Sciences</p>



United Kingdom

-England and Wales: 2.7 million (4.8% of population in 2011).  
 Scotland: 77,000 Muslims (1.4% of population in 2011).  
 Northern Ireland: 3,832 (0.2% of population in 2011).  
 -4,130,000 (6.3% of population in 2016 according to PEW 2017 Report)

White total: 8%.  
 Mixed ethnic group: 4%  
 Asian/Asian British: 68% (includes Pakistani 38%, Bangladeshi 15% and Indian 7%)  
 Black/African/Caribbean/Black British: 10%  
 Other: 11% (includes new category for Arabs at 7%)

No official data available, but a crude ratio could be gained through mosque statistics.  
 In 2014, roughly 4.1% of mosques in Britain were Shi'i.

12.4% of London's population is Muslim, an increase of 3.9% from the 2001 census. Elsewhere in the country, Blackburn has a 27% Muslim population and Bradford, Luton, Slough and Birmingham have over 20% Muslim population each.

1,740 is the rough estimate of mosques as of 2014.

- Cambridge Muslim College
- Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies
- The Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE)

Numerous state funded and private schools at primary and secondary level.

**Table 2:** Estimate of the World Muslim population 2010 and 2020 by continent

	Total Population		Muslim Population		Muslim %	
	2010	2020	2010	2020	2010	2020
Asia	4,197,154,822	4,746,309,359	1,237,795,730	1,454,647,845	29.49	30.65
Africa	1,033,044,104	1,307,200,138	434,541,642	542,270,929	42.06	41.48
Europe	732,729,325	741,656,508	42,052,753	42,706,747	5.74	5.76
Americas	940,248,735	1,053,848,972	8,743,857	9,931,812	0.93	0.94
Oceania	28,911,730	32,467,153	473,154	528,015	0.28	0.25
World	6,932,088,715	7,881,482,130	1,723,607,136	2,050,085,347	24.86	26.01

Source: Kettani (2010), World Muslim Population 1950-2020

**Table 3:** Distribution of countries with majority Muslim population.

Muslim Population	>90%	80% to 90%	70% to 80%	60% to 70%	50% to 60%	Total
Asia	17	5	3	2	1	28
Africa	14	1	2	1	2	20
Europe	1	-	1	-	-	2
Americas	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oceania	-	-	-	-	-	-
World	32	6	6	3	3	50
%	14.41	2.70	2.70	1.35	1.35	22.52

Source: Kettani, 2010 World Muslim Population.

**Table 4:** Distribution of World Muslim population living in majority Muslim countries.

Muslim Population	>90%	80 % to 90%	70 % to 80%	60% to 70%	50% to 60%	Total
Asia	641,143,181	234,650,093	15,827,673	17,135,850	2,384,821	911,141,617
Africa	219,228,326	8,751,836	34,627,152	9,860,995	6,202,760	278,671,068
Europe	1,609,567	-	2,216,928	-	-	3,826,495
Americas	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oceania	-	-	-	-	-	-
World	861,981,073	243,401,929	52,671,753	26,996,845	8,587,581	1,193,639,180
%	52.09	14.71	3.18	1.63	0.52	<b>72.13</b>

Source: Kettani, 2010 World Muslim Population.

**Table 5:** Estimate of the World Muslim population from 2000 to 2075.

Year	Population	Muslim %	Muslims
2000	6,150,471,087	22.72	1,397,526,691
2010	6,925,824,107	23.90	1,654,941,394
2020	7,798,921,234	25.13	1,959,770,095
2030	8,782,084,481	26.43	2,320,746,124
2040	9,889,189,225	27.79	2,748,211,429
2050	11,135,860,028	29.22	3,254,412,872
2075	14,984,127,319	33.14	4,966,253,886

Source: Kettani, 2010 World Muslim Population

**Table 6:** Non-Muslim majority countries with a Muslim population larger than 1 million

Country (MP > 1 million)	Total 2010	Muslims 2010	Total 2020	Muslims 2020	Muslims % 2020
India	1,214,464,312	163,102,557	1,414,672,803	189,990,557	13.43
China	1,361,763,412	142,712,806	1,455,502,495	152,536,661	10.48
Ethiopia	84,968,236	28,787,238	110,217,429	37,341,665	33.88
Tanzania	45,039,573	13,565,919	59,434,080	17,901,545	30.12
Russia	140,366,561	14,233,169	134,334,183	13,621,486	10.14
USA	317,641,087	6,988,104	350,524,933	7,991,968	2.20
France	62,636,580	6,263,658	66,353,270	6,635,327	10.00
Philippines	93,616,853	4,737,013	112,809,710	5,708,171	5.06
Uganda	33,796,461	4,089,372	46,748,582	5,656,578	12.10
Mozambique	23,405,670	4,189,615	30,018,785	5,298,316	17.65
Ghana	24,332,755	3,866,475	30,317,667	4,817,477	15.89
Cameroon	19,958,351	3,506,682	25,107,112	4,411,320	17.57
Myanmar (Burma)	50,495,672	4,024,505	54,705,488	4,360,027	7.97
Germany	82,056,775	4,283,364	82,038,774	4,282,424	5.52
Kenya	40,862,900	2,864,489	53,108,867	3,722,932	7.01
Thailand	68,139,238	3,107,149	74,469,806	3,395,823	4.56
Benin	9,211,741	2,249,507	12,742,447	3,111,706	24.42
Malawi	15,691,784	2,035,224	20,811,691	2,699,276	12.97
UK	61,899,272	2,475,971	65,043,092	2,601,724	4.00
Sri Lanka	20,409,946	1,724,640	22,196,620	1,875,614	8.45
Nepal	29,852,682	1,253,813	36,476,405	1,532,009	4.20
Italy	60,097,564	1,262,049	63,234,805	1,327,931	2.10
Spain	45,316,586	1,178,231	51,002,777	1,326,072	2.60
Congo-Kinshasa	67,827,495	1,010,630	90,510,272	1,348,603	1.49
Togo	6,780,030	829,876	8,760,158	1,072,243	12.24
Netherlands	16,653,346	965,894	17,426,219	1,010,721	5.80

Source: Kettani, 2010 World Muslim Population

**Table 7:** Non-Muslim majority countries with a Muslim population between 100.000 and 1 million

Country (MP > 100.000)	Total 2010	Muslims 2010	Total 2020	Muslims 2020	Muslims % 2020
Singapore	4,836,691	720,667	5,821,707	867,434	14.90
Bulgaria	7,497,282	914,668	7,020,826	856,541	12.20
S. Africa	50,492,408	737,189	56,816,931	829,527	1.46
Canada	33,889,747	664,239	37,426,974	733,569	1.96
Liberia	4,101,767	501,236	5,956,781	727,919	12.22
Argentina	40,665,732	658,785	44,768,779	725,254	1.62
Belgium	10,697,588	641,855	11,227,051	673,623	6.00
Central African Rep.	4,505,945	450,595	5,420,454	542,045	10.00
Sweden	9,293,026	499,965	9,747,038	524,391	5.38
Ukraine	45,433,415	445,247	42,238,374	413,936	0.98
Australia	21,511,888	367,853	24,138,692	412,772	1.71
Georgia	4,219,191	418,544	3,751,846	372,183	9.92
Austria	8,387,491	353,952	8,788,574	370,878	4.22
Switzerland	7,594,561	323,528	8,028,387	342,009	4.26
Cambodia	15,053,112	289,020	17,758,584	340,965	1.92
Greece	11,183,393	319,845	11,429,787	326,892	2.86
S. Korea	48,500,717	242,504	50,664,528	253,323	0.50
Rwanda	10,277,212	187,045	13,272,654	241,562	1.82
Mauritius	1,296,569	215,879	1,407,003	234,266	16.65
Serbia	7,675,171	245,605	7,242,196	231,750	3.20
Taiwan	23,026,499	209,541	23,775,675	216,359	0.91
Denmark	5,481,283	202,807	5,631,171	208,353	3.70
Madagascar	20,146,442	143,040	26,570,835	188,653	0.71
Burundi	8,518,862	134,598	11,211,996	177,150	1.58
Gabon	1,501,266	141,720	1,827,291	172,496	9.44
Angola	18,992,707	100,661	25,261,561	133,886	0.53
Mongolia	2,701,117	117,499	3,053,760	132,839	4.35
Venezuela	29,043,555	101,652	34,559,937	120,960	0.35
Zimbabwe	12,644,041	111,268	12,835,578	112,953	0.88
Norway	4,855,315	99,534	5,257,424	107,777	2.05
Montenegro	625,516	110,967	592,270	105,069	17.74
Japan	126,995,411	101,596	127,285,709	101,829	0.08

Source: Kettani, 2010 World Muslim Population

**Table 8:** Non-Muslim majority countries with a Muslim population between 10.000 and 100.000

Country (MP > 10.000)	Total 2010	Muslims 2010	Total 2020	Muslims 2020	Muslims % 2020
Trinidad Tobago	1,343,725	77,936	1,394,176	80,862	5.80
Vietnam	89,028,741	71,223	100,760,076	80,608	0.08
Suriname	524,345	70,524	588,527	79,157	13.45
Zambia	13,257,269	59,658	16,790,916	75,559	0.45
Romania	21,190,154	65,689	20,283,010	62,877	0.31
Congo- Brazzaville	3,758,678	46,983	4,654,134	58,177	1.25
Fiji	854,098	53,552	909,942	57,053	6.27
Croatia	4,409,659	56,444	4,315,931	55,244	1.28
Guyana	761,442	54,748	766,661	55,123	7.19
Slovenia	2,024,912	49,003	2,065,204	49,978	2.42
Bhutan	708,484	35,424	894,462	44,723	5.00
Brazil	195,423,252	39,085	219,264,353	43,853	0.02
New Zealand	4,303,457	38,731	4,787,689	43,089	0.90
Ireland	4,589,002	34,876	5,536,258	42,076	0.76
Réunion	837,094	35,158	968,163	40,663	4.20
Poland	38,038,094	26,627	37,647,364	26,353	0.07
Belarus	9,587,940	23,970	9,143,897	22,860	0.25
Czech Republic	10,410,786	20,822	10,600,573	21,201	0.20
Portugal	10,732,357	15,025	11,263,651	15,769	0.14
New Caledonia	253,743	10,987	299,168	12,954	4.33
Panama	3,508,475	10,525	4,171,544	12,515	0.30
Mexico	110,645,154	11,065	123,000,846	12,300	0.01
Dominican Republic	10,225,482	10,225	11,841,734	11,842	0.10
Luxembourg	491,772	9,639	553,506	10,849	1.96
Colombia	46,300,196	9,260	53,898,707	10,780	0.02

Source: Kettani, 2010 World Muslim Population

**Table 9: Mosques in Europe and USA**

Country	Muslim Population (million)	Number of Mosques	Potential number of Muslims per mosque
Germany	3.2 - 3.4	2,600	1269
France	4.2	2,100	1571
UK	2.4	850-1,500	2824-1600
Italy	1.3	764	1702
Spain	0.8 – 1.0	668	1347
Netherlands	1.0	432	2315
Greece	0.2 – 0.3	< 400	625
Portugal	0.04	33	1212
Belgium	0.4 – 0.5	330	1364
Sweden	0.4	> 50	8000
Austria	0.3	> 200	1500
Switzerland	0.4	> 100	4000
Denmark	0.19	115	1652
Finland	0.04	30-40	1143
Norway	0.12	120	1000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.5	1,867	803
Europe	16.79	10,989	1528
United States	5-6	1,643	3348

Source: Ethnobarometer 2010 Report: *Mosques in Europe: Why a solution has become a problem*

## Muslim Education in Numbers

**Table 10:** Average years of formal schooling among religious groups, by gender

Religious group	Average years of formal schooling	Men	Women	Women trail men by
Jews	13.4	13.4	13.4	0
Christians	9.3	9.5	9.1	0.4
Unaffiliated	8.8	9.2	8.3	0.8
Buddhists	7.9	8.5	7.4	1.1
Muslims	5.6	6.4	4.9	1.5
Hindus	5.6	6.9	4.2	2.7
Global Average	7.7	8.3	7.2	1.1

Data source: PEW 2016 Report on Religion and Education Around the World

**Table 11:** The level of educational attainment by religion

Religious Group	No formal schooling	Primary schooling	Secondary schooling	Higher education
Jews	1	7	30	61
Unaffiliated	8	24	53	16
Christians	9	24	47	20
Buddhists	10	34	45	12
Muslims	36	27	29	8
Hindus	41	21	28	10
Global average	19	25	42	14

Source: PEW 2016 Report on Religion and Education Around the World



**Table 12:** Average years of schooling for Muslims by region

Region	Average years of schooling	Age 25+ Muslim population in 2010
North America	13.6	1.8 million
Europe	9.5	21.6 million
Middle-East - North Africa	5.9	107.3 million
Asia Pacific	5.9	462.2 million
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.6	79.7 million
Global	5.6	672.6 million

Source: PEW 2016 Report on Religion and Education Around the World

**Table 13:** Gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in average years of schooling

Country	Gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in average years of schooling (-) Muslims are less educated
Germany	-4.2
Spain	-3.2
Finland	-3.1
Bulgaria	-3.1
France	-2.9
Switzerland	-2.2
Austria	-2.1
Georgia	-2.0
Serbia	-1.5
Slovenia	-1.3
Russia	-0.4
Romania	-0.4
Croatia	-0.4
Country	Gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in average years of schooling (+) Muslims are more educated
Hungary	+1.3
Slovakia	+1.2
Ireland	+1.0
Portugal	+0.6
Czech Rep.	+0.6
Lithuania	+0.4
Estonia	+0.3
UK	+0.2

Source: PEW 2016 Report on Religion and Education Around the World

